The summit closed after a long final night of negotiations, with the Brazilian presidency issuing a compromise package known as the “global mutirão”, a nod to the idea of collective effort. The deal attempted to pull together the most contentious threads of the talks, from climate finance and trade measures to the ongoing struggle to keep the 1.5°C goal alive.
To understand why this summit mattered, it is useful to step back and look at what the COP process is, what COP30 was meant to achieve and why the resulting deal has been described as both an uneasy win and a disappointment.
COP explained
The Conference of the Parties, or COP, is the annual gathering of the countries that have signed the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Since 1995, it has served as the primary forum for negotiating global climate policy and assessing progress on emissions reduction, climate finance, adaptation and technological cooperation. The Paris Agreement in 2015 further elevated the importance of COPs by establishing a long-term framework centred on nationally determined contributions (NDCs) – the climate action plans through which each country sets out how it will cut emissions. Paris also marked the first time all nations committed to a shared temperature goal of keeping global warming “well below” 2°C, while pursuing efforts to limit it to 1.5°C.
The process is inclusive, but limited. Every decision must be reached by consensus, a rule that gives every nation, large or small, progressive or fossil-fuel producing, veto power over the final text. As global politics becomes increasingly fragmented, reaching ambitious agreements has become more and more difficult. COPs now often reveal the limits of multilateralism as much as its potential, with competing priorities, economic tensions and geopolitical alliances shaping what is possible inside the negotiating rooms.
What COP30 was meant to be
COP30 was billed as the “implementation COP”, a moment of accountability and an opportunity for governments to demonstrate how they plan to deliver the emissions, reductions and resilience measures required to keep the Paris Agreement alive. COP30 was also an “NDC year”, where countries were expected to submit new or updated plans extending to 2035. NDCs are revised every five years, yet fewer than 10% met the early deadlines.
Hosting COP30 in Belém was also an opportunity for Brazil to shine a light on forests, biodiversity and Indigenous peoples. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva framed the summit as the “Forest COP”. Expectations centred on a push towards ending deforestation, establishing long-term forest finance mechanisms and setting clearer pathways to phase down fossil fuels following the milestone text agreed at COP28 in Dubai.
But even before negotiators arrived in Belém, the political context had shifted dramatically. The return of Trump to the White House meant the United States (historically central to global climate diplomacy) did not send an official delegation. Wars, rising nationalism and tensions among major economies set a difficult backdrop.
Where delegates made progress in Belém
The most visible breakthrough was the pledge to triple climate finance for developing countries by 2035, although the timeline was pushed further than vulnerable countries wanted. The commitment was a rare moment of alignment between developed and developing nations.
Another significant outcome was the adoption of a Just Transition Mechanism, designed to ensure that workers and communities are supported as economies move away from fossil fuels. The concept has been discussed for years, however this is one of the first attempts to give it a concrete institutional footing within the UN. Negotiations were contentious, with the UK and others initially concerned that the mechanism could duplicate existing initiatives, would take years to operationalise and would lack the necessary funding. Nevertheless, a compromise was eventually reached, and the final proposal was broadly welcomed by unions, civil society groups and many climate-vulnerable nations.
COP30 also strengthened recognition of Indigenous peoples and local communities, acknowledging their central role in protecting biodiversity and maintaining forest ecosystems. While largely symbolic at this stage, the inclusion of rights-based language signals a shift in global climate governance towards acknowledging stewardship and traditional knowledge.
Finally, the summit reaffirmed that the global transition towards low-emission, climate-resilient economic development is “irreversible”. Though this formulation carries no binding legal weight, such language matters in shaping long-term market expectations and sends an important signal to policymakers and investors that the decarbonisation pathway remains firmly in place.
Where COP30 fell short
Yet for a summit framed as the moment when implementation would take centre stage, COP30 struggled to advance the core priorities that would have qualified as real progress.
The most obvious failure was the inability to secure any reference to fossil fuels in the final text. Negotiations stretched long into the night, with countries such as the UK, EU member states and Colombia pushing for language aligned with the “transition away from fossil fuels” agreed at COP28. But strong opposition from Saudi Arabia, Russia, India and others ensured that all such references were removed. European diplomats described the opposition as an “organised blocking majority”, emboldened by the absence of the United States. The final outcome preserved only the weakest echo of past commitments, offering little clarity on how, or whether, major economies will deliver the emissions reductions required this decade.
Deforestation was the second major area where ambition fell short. Brazil had hoped COP30 would deliver a global roadmap to end deforestation by 2030, with significant support among rainforest countries, the EU and many climate-vulnerable nations. But once again, disagreements over finance, governance and accountability proved insurmountable. The issue was ultimately pushed into future summits, leaving a central element of Brazil’s agenda unresolved.
In the absence of a UN-led deforestation roadmap, much of the attention turned instead to President Lula’s flagship initiative: the Tropical Forest Forever Facility (TFFF). The mechanism is one of the most ambitious ever proposed. The TFFF is designed not as a grant fund but as a large endowment. Investment returns would pay tropical forest nations to preserve their forests, mitigating the commercial incentives to clear land for cattle ranching, agriculture and other economic activities. The Brazilian Presidency proposed establishing $25 billion in public “sponsor capital” to unlock a further $100 billion from private investors, generating annual returns that could pay forest countries around $4 per hectare. Funding would be conditional on deforestation remaining below 0.5%.
By the final days of COP30, the TFFF had secured $6.6 billion in pledges, with major contributions from Norway ($3 billion), Germany ($1 billion), France (€500 million), Brazil and Indonesia.
For the first time, global trade featured prominently in negotiations as the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) drew strong opposition from major trading partners like China, India and Saudi Arabia. These countries argued that the EU’s border tax on carbon-intensive imports, in particular, steel, cement, fertiliser and aluminium, imposes unilateral costs that disadvantage their industries. The EU countered that the mechanism is a climate measure, not a trade barrier, designed to prevent carbon leakage by applying the same carbon price to imports as to European producers.
Saudi Arabia reportedly used closed-door sessions to criticise the EU for “punishing” developing economies through its climate policies. With no consensus in sight, negotiators agreed to an ongoing dialogue on trade and climate within future UNFCCC meetings, a typical COP compromise that parks difficult questions for another day. Still, the prominence of CBAM at COP30 indicates that climate and trade are becoming increasingly intertwined, a development with major implications for global supply chains and for the UK, which is moving towards alignment with the EU’s carbon border rules.
The UK at COP30
The UK arrived in Belém seeking to re-establish a sense of climate leadership after a year marked by domestic policy uncertainty. Although the overall delegation was not among the largest at COP30, it was nonetheless varied and politically broad. Aongside Secretary of State Ed Miliband, ten other MPs travelled to Brazil, including two ministers, Katie White and Mary Creagh. They were joined by six private secretaries and more than thirty policy advisers from DESNZ.
Among the MPs, it was notably cross-party, with Labour figures including Anneliese Dodds MP, former Minister of State for Development, Rosie Wrighting MP from the Business and Trade Sub-Committee on Economic Security, Sarah Coombes MP, and Uma Kumaran MP from the Foreign Affairs Committee. The Conservatives were represented by Blake Stephenson MP, member of the Environmental Audit Committee, while the Liberal Democrats were represented by Pippa Heylings MP, their spokesperson for Energy Security and Net Zero. Their presence was further supported by four UK climate and energy organisations: the Conservative Environment Network, the Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit, the Labour Climate and Environment Forum, and Liberal Democrats for Climate and Nature.
Prime Minister Keir Starmer was reportedly in Belém for much of the week. His presence, set against a tense pre-Budget period and sensitive foreign-policy developments, prompted mixed reactions as some questioned the optics of leaving the UK at such a moment, while others saw it as a statement of renewed commitment to international climate leadership. At the leaders’ summit, Starmer framed climate action as “an immense opportunity to be seized,” emphasising that the UK was “doubling down on the fight against climate change.” The Prince of Wales, meanwhile, drew attention to mounting climate impacts at home, particularly severe flooding, underscoring the urgency of strengthening national adaptation efforts.
Nonetheless, the UK’s role felt diminished compared to previous summits. The decision not to invest in the TFFF attracted criticism, especially given the UK’s leadership in establishing frameworks such as the Taskforce on Nature-related Financial Disclosures (TNFD) and its hosting of COP26 in Glasgow, where forests and nature were central themes. Critics argued that opting out undermined the UK’s credibility regarding nature finance, particularly when far less wealthy countries stepped forward with major contributions.
The UK also initially hesitated to support the Just Transition Mechanism, raising concerns about its approach to climate justice. However, British delegates backed the final agreement. The UK was active in pushing for fossil-fuel language and reportedly aligned closely with the EU during tense overnight discussions. Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero, Ed Miliband, confirmed that a British walkout was considered at several points as the risk of a weak deal loomed. Moreover, UK deliberation at COP30 took place against a backdrop of domestic policy reversals, delays and inconsistent messaging over the forthcoming Budget, limiting its ability to assert leadership and help shape the eventual outcome.
For UK investors and financial institutions, the signals from COP30 reinforced growing trends: an increasing focus on adaptation finance, greater scrutiny of nature and biodiversity risks, a rise in blended-finance models, tensions between trade and climate policy and ongoing shifts in regulatory environments. The reaffirmed “irreversible” direction of global decarbonisation, even in diluted form, remains a critical marker for long-term capital allocation.
Reflections from the Policy Liaison Group on ESG
From our perspective, COP30 was a summit that kept global climate cooperation alive, but exposed how strained relations have become. The fragile agreement reflects deepening geopolitical divides and persistent North–South tensions over finance, responsibility and implementation.
For the UK, the challenge now is to ensure coherence between domestic policy, international commitments and investor expectations. Businesses, regulators and financial institutions increasingly recognise that climate and nature risks are material, systemic and interconnected. The signals from Belém, even the modest ones, reinforce the direction of long-term capital allocation and underline the centrality of adaptation, nature finance and just transition frameworks.
COP30 did not deliver the decisive implementation package many hoped for, nor did it provide a roadmap that matches the urgency described in scientific assessments. But it did preserve multilateralism at a moment when it could easily have fractured. The transition remains underway, but the responsibility for acceleration now lies increasingly with coalitions beyond governments, importantly, investors, regulators, cities, companies and civil society.
One can only hope that COP31 in Turkey will unfold in a more favourable geopolitical climate, one that enables genuine convergence and more decisive collective action. Whether that hope is realised remains to be seen.
Image credit: “Prime Minister Keir Starmer attends COP30 Summit in Brazil” by Number 10, CC BY 4.0
